Many politicians, commentators and experts on the Soviet Union
believe and tell the rest of us that Gorbachev has decided that the
Soviet Union needs a respite from the cold war, its adventures in
Afghanistan and Central America and the arms race.  It follows, they
say, that the Soviet Union is likely to give up control of Afghanistan
and encourage their Latin American clients in Nicaragua, El Salvador and
even Cuba to compromise with their opponents to the extent of accepting
free elections, whatever their results might be.

	However, there is another possibility.  Maybe the Politburo
doesn't have to make any hard decisions.  Maybe they can have it all.
Maybe a deal can be made whereby the U.S. will stop supplying Stingers
to the Afghanis.  Maybe then the Afghan communists will be able to
wear down their opponents with Soviet supplied helicopter gunships.
Maybe, once the U. S. no longer needs Pakistan to transmit supplies, the
conflict over the alleged Pakistani nuclear weapons program will escalate
to a level that will prevent supply from being resumed if even if the
U. S. thinks the Soviets have reneged on their withdrawal from Afganistan.

	Maybe letting La Prensa publish for a year or so will suffice to
eliminate U. S. support for the Contras.  If the present Contras can be
killed off, no Nicaraguans are likely to risk their lives in the future
on the bais of U. S. promises of support, no matter how much Nicaraguan
gulags are extended.

	The recent defection of a high Nicaraguan officer, his statements
in Washington, and the Nicaraguan reaction to them shed new light on the
matter.  They tell us the following.

	1. The Politburo in Moscow is not convinced there is any need to
relax their pressure for communist military and political advantage in
the Third World.  The proposed expansion of the Nicaraguan forces to
500,000 will be enormously expensive for the Soviet Union.  It also seems
that the Soviet Union regards the present relaxation arising from the
Arias peace proposals as a mere blip in the course of events.

	2. The statement by Humberto Ortega, the Nicaraguan Defense
Minister, is even more informative.  He could have said that xxx turns
out to have been a CIA agent all along and that the statements about
Nicaraguan plans for military expansion a CIA invention.  Plenty of
Americans would have been happy to believe it.  Most likely the Soviets
would have preferred that he put it that way and regard him as
``politically immature'' to have spilled the beans.  Flat denial of much
more obvious facts that this has served the communists well in the past.

	I can think of only two reasons why Ortega would not merely confirm
what xxx said but top it by saying that he plans 600,000 not merely 500,000.
First perhaps he belongs to a Nicaraguan communist faction that chafes under
the most temporary concessions to democracy, that fears the concessions
may turn out to be real, and even welcomes war.  600,000 is twenty percent
of the Nicaraguan population.  That force ration is twice what any
country in the world maintains today, probably not excepting Iran and Iraq
that are fighting a war.  Most likely, such a ratio is unmaintainable
without the complete destruction of Nicaragua's civilian economy.  (Remember
that the 3 million includes children, mothers with children, old people,
criminals and political opponents in prison, sick people, and the Sandinista
civilian bureaucracy).

	Another possible reason for the statement is that Ortega worries that
denying his intentions might be interpreted by the Soviets as letting them
out of a commitment to finance the military expansion.

	That Ortega would give such a figure suggests that the Sandinista
leaders are living in a world of fantasy.  It also suggests that the Soviets
who deal with the Sandinistas, e.g. the International Department of the Central
Committee of the Party, have no instructions to discourage such fantasies.
Presumably this is because the Politburo still thinks that a show of detente
may suffice to get concessions from the U. S.  They may be right about that.
Anyway, good luck to any Americans who think that any Soviet concessions will
turn out to be real without the most resolute and untrusting behavior by
the U. S. Administration and Congress.

	What does this tell us about the INF treaty and the ``momentum''
towards future agreements?  First, does anyone now deny that it was the
presence of the Pershings that persuaded the Soviets to consider scrapping
the SS-20 missiles?  Second we'd better hope the inspection provisions
are adequate, and our negotiators didn't blink at the last moment in order
to earn President Reagan ``a place in history as a peace maker.''

	Let's assume the INF treaty is for real, and the Polituro really did
decide to make real concessions in this case.  The Nicaraguan defection
and other evidence tells us that the Politburo still prefers fake
concessions to real concessions.  They will make real concessions only if
they see no alternative.

	The Senate should take its time on the INF treaty and make sure
the inspection provisions are adequate and there aren't any loopholes
that permit the Soviets to avoid disarming to an extent comparable to
the dismantling of the Pershings and cruise missiles.  After all this
is even mroe important than making sure the next Supreme Court justice
isn't too conservative.  Perhaps they should also wait and see whether
our NATO allies will really increase their non-nuclear forces before
ratifying the treaty.  Maybe the Europeans would rather have the Pershings
after all.

	Before signing a treaty on strategic weapons the Administration
should see how the inspection provisions of the INF treaty work out in
practice.  It is quite possible that having several hundred men in the
designated places in the Soviet boondocks will not leave us convinced
that the Soviets are adhering to the INF treaty.

	Maybe Gorbachev can make the Politburo accept the need for real
concessions to the West in order to get the Soviet Union out of its
economic mess.  For this to occur, however, the Politburo must be
convinced that fake concessions won't do as well.